Raqeb Osman – Activists
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Iraqi army during the advance of the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), known in Arabic as al-Hashd al-Shaabi, were established following a religious edict (fatwa) issued by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the leading Shi’a cleric in Iraq and a figure widely regarded as aligned with Iran’s strategic interests. The formation was both rapid and chaotic, consolidating around 67 different Shi’a militia groups with an initial estimated manpower of 60,000 fighters—a number that would later swell to over 230,000.
From its inception, the PMF represented more than just a response to the security vacuum; it emerged as a sectarian and ideologically motivated force with political ambitions and military capabilities that have significantly reshaped Iraq’s security architecture. Although originally justified as a protective measure for Shi’a-majority areas against the threat of ISIS, the PMF has since evolved into a parallel power structure, often acting independently of Iraq’s official armed forces and outside the legal authority of the central government.
The danger posed by the PMF lies not merely in its arms, but in its ideological orientation—one that frames all actors outside its narrow definition of legitimacy as adversaries. Numerous reports and documented incidents link PMF factions to acts of violence against peaceful protesters and civil society activists, particularly during the 2019 demonstrations across southern Iraq. These actions have raised serious concerns regarding the group’s commitment to democratic norms and human rights.
Crucially, the PMF’s current influence extends beyond the Shi’a-dominated regions it was originally tasked to protect. It now operates freely in areas such as the Nineveh Plains, exercising both military and political authority over towns and villages, often in direct competition with local governance. What was once a temporary mobilization in the face of a national crisis has transformed into a deeply entrenched actor with vested interests in Iraq’s political economy.
Iran, which views the PMF as an extension of its broader regional security doctrine, continues to support and celebrate its role under the guise of the “axis of resistance.” Consequently, many of the PMF factions maintain ideological and logistical links to Tehran, blurring the line between national defense and foreign proxy.
Calls for the disbanding or integration of the PMF into state security forces face a sobering reality: this is no longer merely a religiously sanctioned force—it is an autonomous, politically connected, and economically embedded entity. To believe that a single fatwa could dissolve what has become an institutionalized network is naïve; in fact, not even a hundred fatwas may suffice. The PMF represents a long-term challenge to the sovereignty of the Iraqi state and the rule of law—an apparatus that will continue to reproduce the logic of militarized sectarianism unless meaningfully restructured or demobilized.
