
Arez Noori – Activists
Highlighting looting, corruption, and decadence as deeply entrenched realities is not merely a neutral observation, but rather an outright indictment of the ruling duopoly—both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Far from denying or distancing themselves from this reality, these two parties have not only refused to confront it, but have adopted anti-corruption slogans merely as a façade—an empty, shameful pretense.
This kind of corruption is not a vague, undefined phenomenon within the framework of political-militia power structures. Rather, it is a systematic architecture of coercive authority and extraction of wealth and resources from Kurdistan. Since the very first days of their governance, the ruling parties have pursued this project with clear plans and organized strategies. Corruption has come to define the dominant reality overshadowing the entirety of Kurdish society.
If this systematic looting and corruption in Kurdistan is, in fact, an inherent feature of the political authority wielded by the KDP and PUK, along with all their affiliates—those within parliament, ministries, and various administrative bodies who claim the title of “opposition”—then they have collectively and formally acknowledged their corruption. All of them, under the guise of being the “clean-handed faction,” have tacitly accepted and internalized this pervasive corruption.
Therefore, if we accept that this corruption is structurally defined, then to speak of resistance to corruption by those very power structures is not only a contradiction, but also a distortion and deliberate manipulation. In other words, confronting corruption under the shadow of Kurdish political authority is fundamentally meaningless. The system itself must be dismantled, and only by ending the rule of the KDP and PUK can the path to reform be opened.
Simultaneously, this corruption and looting presents another grave and urgent danger: political instability and systemic insecurity, which is also driven by the same power structures of the KDP and PUK. This implies that the political future of Kurdistan is increasingly uncertain and bleak. For over thirty years, this instability has loomed like a black cloud over the people of Kurdistan, periodically resurfacing as a dangerous epidemic, inflicting numerous casualties. One of the most prominent examples was the rise of ISIS, whose brutal legacy—including the genocide of Yazidis, the occupation and destruction of Mosul, and other war crimes—still haunts the region.
This instability, on one hand, serves the geopolitical interests of the KDP and PUK, who remain silent in the face of daily and direct interventions by Turkey and Iran. On the other hand, they passively await the unfolding tensions between global powers and regional states playing out in Iraq, Kurdistan, and beyond. Without extending this discussion further, it is important to note that the very formation of the Barzani and Talabani family-based rule was premised from the outset on an implicit agreement: that they would not be held accountable for any conflict or catastrophe that befalls the people of Kurdistan.
The current alliance between the Iraqi government, Iran, and the PUK represents a calculated and foreseeable political deal. This alignment illustrates the declining political balance of the PUK, whose diminished influence compels it to take drastic and dangerous actions to preserve its standing—even if it means provoking larger catastrophes—so long as it can maintain internal cohesion and control over its territories.
In every sense, the political atmosphere of the region generally—and of Iraq specifically—demonstrates that the Kurdistan Regional Government stands at the brink of an inevitable weakening. Thus, it becomes necessary to highlight key aspects of the PUK’s dependence on Iran.
Iran’s persistent effort to militarize and control opposition forces stems from its desire to reassert dominance over public uprisings that have posed existential threats to its regime. This strategy seeks to revert to a time before the widespread protests that openly called for the downfall of the Islamic Republic. It is evident that the fall of the Islamic Republic would concurrently lead to the downfall of the PUK and the disbandment of Iraqi Shi’a militias aligned with Tehran.
Therefore, the PUK’s cooperation with Iran is a clear indication of its complicity in suppressing public dissent within Iran, all in the name of preserving a corrupt and exploitative power. The fate of the PUK is inextricably tied to that of the Islamic Republic.
Moreover, it is no secret that within the current political landscape of Kurdistan, the PUK is in a state of persistent decline relative to the KDP and the Barzani family. In order to reverse this trajectory and regain political balance, the PUK seeks opportunities to weaken the KDP and strengthen its own institutional standing. Increasingly, it appears that…